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A REVIEW OF ULRICH V. REINOEHL
143 PA: 238 AND GERMAN& AUTHORITIES

Some time since during a conversation with a valued friend, whose
perspicacity in matters legal is widely recognized, the discussion turned
upon capricious opinions handed down by courts, and incidentally the
writer called attention to the case which forms the caption of this
article, with its rule of law in reference to the quantum of insurable
interest a creditor may have in the life of his debtor. The result was
a request to contribute some observations upon the above mentioned
case.
INSURABLE INTEREIST GEN4RALLY

In

Appeal of Corson, i13 Pa. 438, Clark, J., defining insurable

interest in life policies said, "An insurable, however, is not necessarily
a definite pecuniary interest, such as is recognized and protected at
law, it may be contingent, restricted as to time, or indeterminate in
amount, but it must be actual, such as will reasonably justify a well
grounded expectation of advantage, dependent upon the life insured,
so that the purpose of the party effecting the insurance may be to secure that advantage and not merely to put a wager upon human life."
This benefit accruing from the continuance of the life insured or consequent detriment suffered by the termination of the same; may grow out
of a relationship based upon blood, marriage, or commercial intercourse,
and possibly certain close social ties. Carpenterv. Ins. Co. 16i Pa. 9.
A policy devoid of such insurable interest is anathematized as a gambling contract and contra bonos mores. U. B. Mut. Aid v. McDonald,
122 Pa. 324. Of such contracts, Paxson, C. J., uses the following forceful language in Ulrich v. Reinoehl: "The law very properly lays a
mailed hand upon speculative life insurance; of all the forms of gai-
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bling it is one of the most objectionable. The records of our own court
show that it sometimes leads to murder. The holder of a policy upon
a life in which he has no interest, either of a social or pecuniary nature,
has a strong interest in the death of the assured. This interest grows.
and strengthens with each payment of premium. He has made a bid
upon the life of another person. A man who will engage in such a
transaction cannot safely be regarded as a saint. He sees with growing
impatience that life prolonged from year to year, and his money slipping away in premiums. A man thus situated soon becomes familiar
with the thought of the death of the person who stands between him
and what, in his morbid fancy, he may regard as his rights. That
crime follows, in some instances, is a fact of which we have
judicial knowledge."
INSURABLE INTEREST, PARTICULAR INSTANCE S

It is said that every individual has an insurable interest in his own
life, Northwestern Masonic Aid Association v.Jones, 154 Pa. 99, but
it has been suggested further by one writer on insurance that it is more
accurate to say the question of insurable interest is immaterial when the
policy is upon the insured's own life. Vance, Ins., p. 128. Yet whatever difficulties may be encountered in defining the metes and bounds
of insurable interest, the principle is elementary and well settled that a
creditor has an insurable interest in the life of his debtor. Scott v.
Dickson, io8 Pa. 6.
AMOUNT OF RECOVZERY

In both marine and fire policies, in cases of total loss, the amount
of recovery depends upon the market value of the property at the time
of destruction, except in cases of valued, policies, where the value of
the subject matter is fixed conclusively at the inception of the risk.
In life insurance likewise, the policies are valued conclusively at the
inception of the risk. Mainly, it is said, because of the incertitude of
valuing human life. There is no limit, as far as the law is concerned,
upon the akount of insurance one may take out upon his own life, irrespective of what his earning capacity may be. It further appears that
in cases of insurable interest based upon blood, marriage and possibly
social relationship, the ldw has placed no limits to the amount ofinsurance third persons may carry upon one in whom they are interested, except such apparent disproportion as would obviously be beyond the pale
of good faith. At least there are no decisions in mind where the courts
have laid down any rule approaching mathematical precision in such
cases. However, when we turn our attention to insurance by creditors
upon the lives of their debtors, it is discovered tht the nature of the
interest is but vaguely defined, and in every instance we find the
amount of the debt used in various ways to approximate the interest.
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What proportion shall the amount of insurance procured bear to the

amount of the debt? Upon this question the authorities throughout the
various states are by no means harmonious.
RUJ ES SUGGESTE D
From the mass of decisions upon this question, three rules in respect thereto may be gleaned, which, for convenience of discussion
will be classified as, (i) The Pennsylvania rule announced in Ulrich v.
Reinoehl. (2) The Georgia rule laid down in Exchange Bank v. Loh,
104 Ga. 446.
(3) The Texas rule suggested in Equitable Life Ins. Co.
v. Hazlewood, 75 Tex. 338. To these may he added a possible fourth,
characterized by its author as "the only working rule," to the effect
that when the disproportion between the insurance and the debt is so
great, taken with the other circumstances of the case, as to show a
want of good faith in the creditor, the policy shall be deemed a wager
contract, and void. Vance, Ins., p. I4o
ULRICH v. RBINOEHI
In 1877, B indebted to the firm of R and M in the sum of $99.51.
for which a judgment had been obtained, being desirous for certain
reasons of clearing his real estate of this lien, but unable to liquidate
the same, proposed to R and M that in consideration of the satisfaction
of the judgment he (B) would give them a policy on his life in sum of
$3,ooo. The debt, interest and costs, amounting to $110.02, upon the
judgment being satisfied, B obtained a policy in the proposed sum and
assigned the same absolutely to R and M, the latter paying the admission charges and all subsequent assessments and premiums. About
four years later B died and the proceeds of the policy were paid to R
and M, the assignees. U, executor of B, brought assumpsit against
the assignees to recover the money. At the trial, under objection, the
secretary of the insurance society, testified that B was insured at the
age of 42 years; that according to the Carlisle Tables, his expectancy
of life was then 26.34 years; that in the event of his living out the expectancy, there would be paid on the policy in premiums, adding interest to the latter, the sum of $4,336.31. Upon verdict and judgment
for defendants, the plaintiff appealed, the main question appearing in
the assignments of error; (i) to the admission of the evidence objected to, (2) the refusal to charge that the disproportion between the
debt and amount of insurance was so great that the transaction was a
wager and R and M were entitled to retain only out of the fund sufficient to satisfy the debt, interest and costs, plus the premiums paid
with interest, (3) the refusal to charge that the greatest amount retainable by defendants was the principal, etc.., of $99.51, with interest for
the expectancy of life added to the amount of premiums necessay to
insure such aggregate for the expectancy, with interest on the amount
of premiums at the lawful rate for one-half for the period, instead of the
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disproportionate amount actually taken, and having insured in excess
of the sum entitled, defendants are now only entitled to reimbursement.
The opinion of the Supreme Court was delivered by Paxson, C. J., who,
after observing that the question was not free from difficulty and thatthe case had been twice argued, affirmed the judgment of the trial
court, saying inter alia: "We have now reached a point where it is
necessary to lay down some fixed rule by which such cases can be disposed of in the future, otherwise the rulings of the courts and the verdicts of juries upon such questions wij be arbitrary, and where there is
nothing in a case but the amount of the insurance and the amount of
the debt, it is impossible for either a court or jury to arrive at a correct
result. * * * We are of opinion that a creditor may lawfully take out
a policy on the life of his debtor in an amount sufficient to cover the
debt with interest, and the cost of such insurance, with interest thereon
during the period of expectancy of life of the assurred, according to the
Carlisle Tables. We find no error in the ruling of the court below."
At risk of a charge of prolixity, a rather full report of this leading case
is submitted to the indulgent reader, in order that the facts, contention
of counsel, as well as the meaning and scope of "the fixed rule" may
readily be appreciated.
ORIGIN OF THE RULE
In Appeal of Corson, 113 Pa. 438, a creditor, whose claim was
subsequently ascertained to have been between $5oo and $750, was
beneficiary of a policy of $2,ooo taken out by the debtor, of which contract Clark, J., observed, "Considering the character of their business
relations, the unsettled condition of their affairs, the age of the subject
of insurance, the probable amount of premiums which might accrue,
the accumulations from interest, we could not say the transaction carries
with it any inherent evidences of bad faith. The essential thing is, as
stated by the learned judge of the court below, that the policy should
be obtained in good faith, and not for purposes of speculation upon
the hazard of a life in which the insured has no interest. " The rule
as finally adopted in Ulrich v. Reinoehl was first actually proposed by
Paxson, J., in 1887, in Grants' Admin. v. Kline, 115 Pa. 618, where a
creditor holding a claim of $214, was permitted to retain the proceeds
of a $3,ooo policy; the insured, who was 65 years of age at the time the
policy was written, dying within a year after. Says Paxson, J., " We
approach this question with caution, the more so thatthis court has not
yet laid down a rule upon this subject. That we shall be compelled
some day to do so is possible. * * * Speaking for myself it may
be that a policy taken out by a creditor on the life of his debtor, ought
to be limited to the amount of the debt, with interest, and the amount
of premiums, with interest thereon, during the expectancy of life, as
shown by the Carlisle Tables. " In the same year, viz, 1887, arose the
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case of Cooper v. Shaeffer, 1 Atl. 548, the Supreme Court, approving
of the charge of the trial judge that the disproportion between an insurance of $3,ooo and a debt of $ioo was so great as to compel the court
to say as a matter of law, that the policy was a wagering one. In referring to the previous case, Sterrett, J., characterized the rule then
foreshadowed as "just and practicable."
STAE DBCISIS

The report immediately following that containing Ulrich v.
Reinoehl, records a case, Shaffer v. Spangler, 144 Pa. 223, specifically
reaffirming the rule of the former case. In sending the cause back for
retrial, Paxson, C. J., admonishes thus, " Whether the insurance was
s6 disproportioned to the debt as to make it'a speculative or gambling
transaction must be determined according to the rule laid down in Ulrich v. Reinoehl, i43 Pa. 238. " Again, applying the rule in Wheeland v. Atwood, I92 Pa. 237, the court, through Green, J., reasons as
follows: " It was shown by the testimony of the agent of the life insurance company that Mrs. Atwood's expectancy of life at the time the
policy was issued, was 25.99 years, and that the amount of premiums
that Fessler would have been obliged to pay if she had lived out her
expectancy would have been about $4,500., As the policy was for
$5,ooo, Fessler would have been a considerable loser in money if Mrs.
Atwood had lived the full period of her expectancy."
EXPOSITION OF FALI 4ACY

Lumpkin, P. J., in Exchange Bank, v. Loh, sufira, comments on.
the rule as follows. "With the utmost respect we think this is fallacious reasoning. As stated by the distinguished chief justice, 'All life
insurance is, in one sense, speculative,' and this remark applies to
every policy. It is radically erroneous to say that one average man
has a greater or less chance to live out his expectancy than another.
The man of forty-two is no more apt to live out his expectancy of 26
years than the man of 75 is to live out his expectancy of 7 years. Life
insurance premiums are fixed relatively to the different ages and expectancies of the person insured, and every company whose business is
conducted on sound principles proceeds upon the theory that it must
be the gainer in every risk when the insured lives out his expectancy
and all premiums are paid. Clearly, therefore, in every instance of
life insurance, there is a chance for the insured or the person paying
the premiums. to pay in more than the policy will bring back, and as
a consequence, there can, under the doctrine announced in Pennsylvania, be no such thing as a wagering policy. The test that the
amount of the policy taken out to secure a debt must not be out of proportion to the amount of the debt, with added premiums and interest
thereon, will not stand scrutiny, for everyone carrying the burden of
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keeping up a life policy may, whether a debt be secured or not, suffer
loss by paying out more than is finally received on the policy."
FURTHER CRITICISM

In P. & L. Dig. Dec. Vol. 9, sub nomine Insurance, 147o8, the
learned editors have inserted this note: "It is conceived to be impossible to take into consideration, in determining the amount of a creditor's policy, the cost to the creditor of keeping the policy on foot.
There can be no such thing as an insurable interest in premiums paid,
either the recovery should be limited to the debt and interest or else it
should be recognized that a large recovery is in fact a concession to the
creditor's desire to gamble on his debtor's life. The attempt to formulate a rule upon the subject, e.g., in Ulrich v. Reinoehl, it is submitted is altogether unsatisfactory."
THE GEORGIA RULE
justice Lumpkin, who in the quotation, supra, with such cogency
exposes the fallacy of the rule under discussion, lays down in the same
case, Exchange Bank v. Loh, 104 Ga. 446, 44 L. R. A., 372, what we
may denominate the Georgia rule, viz: That the insurable interest
which a creditor has in the life of his debtor cannot exceed in amount
that of the indebtedness to be secured, such indebtedness may, however, include the c)st of taking out and keeping up the insurance, if
made a charge upon the debtor or his estate, or upon the proceeds of
the policy when collected. This rule, it will be observed, is rather
similar to the point marked three, submitted by counsel for plaintiff in
the Ulrich case, and refused by the trial court. Apropos of any rule,
Lumpkin, P. J., remarks. "The truth is, there can be no sound rule
on the subject which does not recognize the truth of the proposition
that whenever a creditor stipulates for receiving more than indemnity
upon a policy insuring his debtor's life he is engaged in a speculative
venture, the gain from which, if successful, would be represented by
the excess of a sum derived from the policy, over the amount of the
"indebtedness" thereby secured."
THE TEXAS RULE
In Equitable Life v. Hazlewood, 75 Tex. 338, 7 L. R. A. 217,
Henry. J., suggests a rule in these words: "When the insurance is
obtained by a person on his own life, and made payable originally, or
by assignment, to another, having none, or only a limited insurable
interest in his life, as the surplus after the payment of the charges will go
to the party whose life is insured, we see no reason for limiting the
amount for which the insurance may be taken out. When the insurance
is not contracted for by the person whose life is insured, but by a
creditor, in his own name, so that there is no party to the contract ex-
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cept himself and the insurer, it becomes immaterial what amount may
be contracted for, as no more will be collected than will be ultimately
sufficient to discharge his debt and disbursements on the policy, including interest upon both."
CONCLUSION

As is stated elsewhere, the rule in Ulrich v. Reinoehl, is, without
cavil," altogether unsatisfactory. " It is not believed our court would
adhere to the rule ultimately in its results. It is a deplorable illustration of specious generalization. A word might be added concerning
the construction of the phrase "such insurance " in the rule. The
casual reader would no doubt infer the reference was to "the debt with
interest," but the points refused by the trial court and the affirmation
by the Appellate Court, as well as a calculation of the amounts in the
principal case and others following, will be convincing that the reference is to the -particular sum in question, e.g. $3,ooo. This renders
the rule absolutely valueless, for obviously, approximation will be attained in every case no matter what the size of the policy. Again, as
insurable interest need only be satisfied at the inception of the risk and
not at the time of loss, Appeal of Corson, i13 Pa. 438, according to
the rule a ridiculously small debt would be capable of supporting a very
large policy, even after the debt had been paid, producing woeful
trafficking in human lives. It is submitted that " the good faith'" rule
of Appeal of Corson, su)5ra, is the only practical rule found in our reports, and further that the adoption of the collateral security rule of
Texas is extremely desirable, if fundamental reasons for the general
doctrine of insurable interest are to be observed.
A. J.W. HuTTON.
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MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH vs. TOMKINS.
Liquor licenses-Constitutionallaw-License not a contract-Delegationof legislative power-"Local option" legislation-Art. III, See. 7, Constitution
of Pennsylvania construed-"Affairs" of counties, etc.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

At the January Quarter Sessions, Tomkins was licensed to sell liquor for
one year from January first. On April first following, a statute was passed authorizing the people of counties to vote whether there should be licenses or not,
and declaring all sales of liquor unlawful in such counties as voted against licenses, existing licenses notwithstanding. The county took the vote in November and voted against license, but Tomkins continued to sell liquor, and
for this he is indicted.
McNeal for the Commonwealth.
Jacobsfor the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

J. :-Tie statement of the case and the able arguments of the learned
counsel present for our consideration several interesting and important questions. Among them may be mentioned the following: (a) Can an indictment
be sustained when based upon a statute which defines an offense but which
does not prescribe a penalty for its violation ? (b) Is this local option act such
a delegation of the legislative poweras would warrant it court in denouneing
it as unconstitutional? (c) Are any of the defenttI('s conmtituion-al riglts
infringed by subjecting him to a punishment imposed by an act passed subsequent to a grant of a license? Each of these is so vital to a decision, that a
determination of any one of them in favor of the defendant would result in
quashing the indictment. However, our view of the case, as will be shown
hereafter, makes it unnecessary for us to definitely adjudicate any of the aforementioned propositions. Nevertheless, we are free to confess, that our opinion
founded on an examination of the following authorities, would be in favor of
sustaining the indictment on every point raised: Act of March 31, 1860, P. L.
382, see. 178; Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491; O'Neill v. Ins. Co., 166 Pa. 72; Baftemyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 85; Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray 597.
Our view of the case, adopted after a diligent search of the authorities, constrains us to grant the motion to quash. While we are unable to cite any perfectly analogous cases, we are, nevertheless, convinced that the legislation here
attempted was abortive, being a violation of Art. III, Sec. 7, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania. That section is as follows: "The General Assembly shall
not pass any local or special law . : . . regulating the affairs of counties,
nor shall the
cities, townships, wards, boroughs, or school disticts .......
General Assendbly indirectly enact such special or local law by the repeal of a
general law." This provision is not found in the previous constitution of 1838
or any of the amendments thereto, and we may rightly infer that it was enacted with a view to remedy a condition deemed injurious to the welfare of the
people. Certainly it is not a gratifying spectacle that one great people living
within the confines of one state should be governed by laws as unlike in nature
as the political sub-divisions are in number. Laws should be uniform, so that
they may be just; and if a rule of uniformity requires anything it surely inRENO,
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sists that people living under like conditions should be subject to similar laws,
or to the same laws. Long ago eminent publicists denounced class legislation
-the genius of our institutions condemns it; and the step from class to local
legislation is not so great that one can be sanctioned and the other renounced
with consistency. Why one portion of a state should enjoy a privilege or un(]ergo a restraint not enjoyed or suffered by another portion, when the conditions in each are essentially similar, is, to say the least, difficult to comprehend.
Surely the state is not disposed to favor one more than the other, and in a properly governed state no community could have any claim upon the beneficence
of the legislative power not enjoyed by every like community. We believe that
these were some of the evils the provision in our present constitution was designed to remedy, and we would be recreant to duty if we (id not discountenance every attempt to evade it. Every law enacted upon any of the subjects
prohibited by this section is void if it be local or special.
What then is a local law? Paxton, J., has defined a local or special law as
"one which operates or may operate within only a portion of the territory occupied by Ehe person or things to which the legislation naturally and properly
relates." Frost v. Cherry, 122 Pa. 417.
Is this act local? The act authorized the people of the different counties
to vote whether there should be licenses or not, and declared all sales of liquor
unlawful in such counties as voted against licenses. In other words, it gave
the people of the respective counties an opportunity to say whether or not that
county, i. e., the county wherein they voted, should have licensed drinking
places. Waiving for a moment consideration of the principle denying a delegation of legislative power, it is patent that if some of the counties vote in favor
of licenses and some against, the very condition the constitution seeks to avoid
will result. The law will not be uniform; some counties will be governed by
a code inoperative in others; the very evil sought to be eradicated NVill again
arise. Nor can it be argued that there is a possibility that all the counties will
vote the same way, and that therefore the law would be general, since it has
been said that the test is results, not possibilities. Frost v. Cherry, supra. If
legislation like this were sustained it would be comparatively easy for any
county, city or borough to secure whatever particular law it might desire without interfering with the legislation of other counties, cities or boroughs, by simply tacking on a provision that it should be operative only in such counties,
etc., which voted for it. The courts have not hesitated to denounce such legislation. Commonwealth v. Denworth, 145 Pa. 173; Appeal of the City of Scranton School District, 113 Pa. 188; Aspar's Appeal, 122 Pa. 266; Frost v. Cherry,
supra;.Cf. Reading v. Savage, 124 Pa. 328.
The constitution speaks of "regulating the affairs of counties," etc. We
are satisfied that both reason and authority dictate that an attempt to legislate
with reference to the subject of licenses to sell liquor is a regulation of the afiirs
of a county. If that clause were limited in its operation only to the ordinary
governmental or administrative affairs of a county or city, the range of subjects upon which the General Assembly may not legislate by local or special
acts would be comparatively narrow. There does not seem to be any disposition to limit its operation to that class of subjects. When the constitution
speaks of the affairs of the county It means such as affect the people of that
county. Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. 322. Saving that of taxation we know of
no subject upon which the legislature iscomp6tent to pass which affects the people of a county so vitally aq does the sale of liquors. Whether liquor is to be sold
at all, and if so, whether under license granted by the law or not, are questions
in which the people always will manifest a decided interest, because their welfare depends on how the sale and consumption of intoxicants is regulated.
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In Frost v. Cherry, supra, a statute was held unconstitutional as local legislation becauseit gave the people of the respective counties an opportunity to say
whether or not the fence law of 1770 should be repealed, and provided for its
repeal in those counties where the electorate should so decree. The case expressly holds that the act affected the great body of the people of the county;
that as such it was a "regulation of the affairs of the county," and approved
the definition of that phrase as laid down in Morrison v. Bachert, supra. If a
fence law and its repeal is one which affects the people of a county, it does not
require much argument to convince the average man that the repeal of the
Brooks liquor license law of 1887 is one of the same class. The effect of the one
is to our mind infinitely greater upon the welfare of the people than the other.
Nor will the fact that the people were given an opportunity to say whether
this act should operate upon themselves, save this piece of legislation. We do
'not believe that Locke's Appeal, supra,has ceased to be law by reason of' the
adoption of the present constitution. Within the limitations laid down in that
case, the legislature may still delegate to the people tile power to legislate, but
the General Assembly cannot do indirectly what it could not have done directly. Directly, it cannot pass a local act; can it by a species of referendum
arrogate to itself that power? We believe ,iot. If the law making power
wishes to submit an act treating of one of the prohibited subjects within Art.
III, See. 7, of the Constitution, to the verdict of the people as to whether it is
to go into operation or not, the question must be, "Shall it go into effect throughout the state ?" The vote of the people of the state must be taken to ascertain
whether it is to be law for the whole state, and not whether it shall be law
for those portions that desire it.
The question of classification is not involved in this case, and hence the
doctrine of Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 346, need not he considered.
On the whole we have concluded that the act is unconstitutional and void,
and that therefore an indictment based upon it must be quashed. Inaddition
to the reasons advanced above, we are l)er~uaded by decisions in many other
states having similar provisions in their organic law, and by the fact that no
local option act, so called, has passed the General Assembly since 1874, that our
decision is correct. Vide 19 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law 493. The decision in
McGonnell's License, 24 Super. Ct. 642, does not interfere with our conclusion.
There the repeal of an existing local law by vote of the people wps held unconstitutional because of an unwarranted delegation of legislative authority. Be-.
sides, the constitution makes provision for the repeal of a local or general law,
and, possibly, if the method of submission be within Locke's Appeal, supra,
will be sustained.
Motion to quash granted.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The defendant was indicted for selling liquor. He had received a license
for one year, but in the midst of the year the voters of the county had, under a
so-called "local option" law, voted agaiist liceuses. The law enacted that when
they should do so, it should thenceforth be unlawful to sell liquor in the county.
A license is not a contract between the state and the licensee. Commonwealth v. Sellers, 130 Pa. 32; Commonwealth v. Jones, 10 Pa. C. C. 611. The
state may, pending the term of the license, take away some, (Commonwealth
v. Donohue, 149 Pa. 104; 10 Pa. 0. C. 611, supra), or all, of the privileges conferred by it, (Cooley, Constit. Lim., 7th edit., 400,) for the police power is inalienable by contract or otherwise.
An objection sometimes made to so called "local option " laws is that they
are essentially an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Such is the
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view taken by the courts of somestates. Such was the view once taken by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Pa. 507; f.
Cooley, Constit. Lim., 173. It has since been held that the suspension of the
application of a statute upon the ascertainment of a fact by a body external
to the legislature, does not impart to this body legislative power. And this
was said of a statute which did notlsuspend its own operation on the ascertainiment. of a fact, by such exterior body, but upon the will of that body. Locke's
Appeal, 72 Pa. 491; OINeil v. Artisan's Insurance Co., 166 Pa. 72; McGonnelPs
License, 209 Pa. 327. A law which forbade the issue of licenses to sell liquor
iA localities, the people of which expressed, by ballot, their will that there
should be none, was held not a delegation of legislative power. Such must be
the decision of the question, should it again present itself for adjudication.
The essence of such a law is, that the legislature expresses its will, not absolutely but conditionally. It wills that there shall be licenses if the people
vote for them, and that there shall be none if the people vote against them.
It makes the will of the locality its will, and it does this in advance of the expression of the locality's will.
There is a well known method by which, in substance, this species of legislation is habitually employed. Instead of submitting distinct and separate
questions to a locality, a large class of questions might be submitted at once.
Instead of allowing a vote at some single time, or at times recurring at considerable intervals, the expression of the Jocal will might be made possible frequently and tit short intervals. The will might be expressed directly by the
electors, or a select body, elected by them, might be the organ of the people of
a locality, for the manifestation of their will. The device for securing regulations and laws specially adapted to localities, has been to create them into socalled cities or boroughs, to allow these cities or boroughs to elect, from time
to time, deliberative bodies called councils; to permit these councils to enact
rules and regulations on a vast variety of subjects, and to impart to such rules
and regulations the force of law.
The legislature might, if it chose, do all the legislation for every borough,
i. e., might determine the content of a local law and also put behind it the will
which makes it law. It may also allow the city or borough council to deterniine the content of a regulation and impart the central legislative will to it,
thus turning it into law. It might allow a council to pass ordinances, and
then, on their being reported to it, enact them. But this is not the ordinary
way of giving the force of law to such ordinances. The legislature may, and
does, in advance of the particular ordainings, enact whatever ordainings shall
occur, on certain subjects, within certain limitq, into law. When the legislature does this, it is sometimes said to delegate to cities and towns the law-making power. It does delegate this power, in this case, precisely as it delegates
it in the case of a submission to a local vte of a definite regulation, accompanied with an enactment of that regulation, if locally approved, into law.
We have intimated that if the legislature can give this power of voicing
the local will to a council chosen by the electors, it could give it to the electors
themselves. If it can give power tn voice the local will concerning an undefined mass of subjects to the locality, it can give this power concerning one
determinate subject. If it can create cities or boroughs, in order to give them
t ,is power, it can give this power to townships or counties. The latter are
rudimentary municipal corporations. Their organs, competences and powers
may be made more or less numerous., according to the legislative desire. At
bottom, then, the question before us is, can the legislature, by a general law,
enact in the localities as law what these localities, by the legislatively-created
organ, will to be law? The constitution does not impose any particular organ-

172

THE

FORUM

ization for borough, city, township or county. It can be made more or less
complex. A so-called legislative power can as well be imparted to a tolvnship
or county as to a borough or city.
It may be that there are some topics with respect to which the constitution refuses to the legislature the power of permitting local will to bring certain regulations into operation. An examination of existing legislation, however, shows that the topics concerning which the local will habitally expresses
itself with general acquiescence in the constitutionality of the delegation, are
numerous and important. When it is better to have uniform rules in all cities,
it would be better for the legislature to enact them. When, on a given subject, one regulation might suit city A and a different one city B and another
city C, it might be better to depute to the cities, severally, the enactment of
their regulations. In actual practice, one borough may have police, and another not; one may pension its policemen, and another not; one may prohibit
dangerous occupations, and another not; one may regulate party-walls, and
another not; one may restrain the running at large of horses, cattle, sheep,
etc., and another not; one may regulate peddling, hawking, etc., and another
not; one may prohibit plays, shows, etc., and another not. Would there be
any shock to principle if boroughs were permitted either to prevent or to tolerate sales of liquor, as they severally chose?
One city may have regulations concerning obstructions on sidewalks or
porches, or police, or hospitals, or sho.ws, and another none or different. One
may offer rewards for the arrest of criminals, a topic which in a sense concerns
the whole .-tate, and another not; regulate bathing in public streams, suppress
houses of prostitution, gambling, Sabbath desecration, while another does not.
One may adopt regulations for the general health and for the removal of nuisances, for precautions against the spread of contagious diseases, for partition
fences, and another not. Would it alarm one to hear that, added to the subjects about which the local will was made dominant, was the subject of repressing intemperance? Is the propagation of physical disease a fit theme for local
volition, and that of mental or moral disease not?
It is true that the effect of so-called local legislation is that one kind of rule
of action is by it made to exist at one spot and another kind at another spot.
One borough may forbid wooden buildings, and others allow them; or the
same borough may forbid them in one part of it and allow them in another
part of it. This production of variety of regulation in the different parts of the
state called boroughs or cities, is, we are assured, not inconsistent with the
constitution. It forbids the General Assembly to pass local or special acts, but
not a general act giving effect to the various wills of the municipalities. Klingler v. Bickel, 117 Pa. 326. The law, as it leaves the legislature, is general,
equally applicable to every borough or every city. It, practically, enacts every
ordinance that any of them may from time to time make within certain limits.
The localness of the rule is not the quality of the General Assembly's law, but
of the local will acting under that law.
We think it undeniable that regulation of many topics can be constitutionally remitted by the assembly to localities'; that it can do this by the creation
of a permanent so-called local legislature, or by the creation of a legislature ad
hoe; that the local legislative body may be composed of persons selected from
the electors, or of the whole number of electors; that there is no constitutional
restraint on creating in counties or townships, this local legislature, whether
permanent or momentary, select or universal; and that the range of subjects
which can be put within the competence of thelocal will isindefinitely vastand
does not exclude the selling of liquors.
The obstacle which is cited, to the remission to the localities of the deci-
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sion whether liquors shall be sold in them, i. e., to the enactment of a local
option law, is the 7th section of Art. III of the Constitution of 1874, which ordains that "The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law
regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, wards, boroughs or school
districts."
It might be enough to repeat that under this very section the habit of endowing local wills with legislative power, has flourished. It is therefore recognized, as a principle, that when the General Assembly, by a general law,
confers on the ordinances of cities and boroughs the force of law, the law does
not become local and special in the constitutional sense, by reason of the posibility that, through the diverse action of the localities, the rule of action will
vary in the several localities.
The principle, however, was laid down in Frost v. Cherry, 122 Pa. 417, City
of Scranton School District's Appeal, 113 Pa. 176, that when the operation of
a rule of action is made to depend at separate places, on local wills, tile po.-sibility that these wills will be different makes the general law under which
these wills are to speak, and from which they get their legislative efficacy,
special and local. The logical application of that principle would condemn all
local municipal legislation. In Frost v. Cherry, 122 Pa. 417, it condemned the
law which gave local county wills the power to determine whether it should
be obligatory or not for land owners to build fences. As the ordinances of cities
and boroughs deal with affairs of cities and boroughs, there is always the possibility of the production of one rule in one city and another in another, under
a general law giving power to the local will. Nay thi$ variety is intended to be
made possible. A variety of legislation as to affairs of cities and boroughs is
therefore not prohibited, nor is a general law forbidden under which this various legislation may spring up. The difference between the legislation in Frost
v. Cherry and ordinary municipal legislation was, that in that case the mnunicipality was the slightly organized county without a separate legislative or
gan, whereas the city or borough has such an organ, which operate-s not occasionally and by special and particular legislative delegation, but regularly, permanently, and under a general delegation; a difference absolutely irrelevant.
Even if we could concede that the constitution prohibits general legislation giving effect to possibly variant local wills, it would be necessary to inquire whether the sale of liquor is one of the topics concerning which local and
special legislation is forbidden. The 7th section of Art. III prohibits local or
special laws "regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, wards, boroughs or school districts." It would be necessary to discover that a law about
liquor selling isra law about an affair of a county.
The phrase "affairs of counties" is, at first sight, seen to be exceedingly
vague. In Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. 322, the word "affairs" is self-evidently said to be one of "broad signification." It is added, "that the convention
used it understandingly," but, as the convention did not enact the constitution, but the people who voted for it, it would be more useful for us to be assured that they used it understandingly, and what that understanding wa.%.
The same opinion adds that '"when it [the constitution] speaks of the affairs
of a county, it means such affairs as affect the people of the county." It is
hardly necessary to suggest that this is a definition which does not define.
What affair does nol affect the people, that is, some of the people, of a county?
The state is composed of counties. Every square foot of it lies in some county.
All its people are in some county. If an affair affecting the people of a county
is an affair of a county, every imaginable law is a law regulatingsueh an affair.
Every county has fences. Therefore fences are a county affair. Frost v. Cherry,
1232 Pa. 417. Every county has houses; laws regulating them are laws regu-
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lating county affairs. Every county has men, women, children in it. All contracts and torts are made in some county. All crimes are committed in some
county. All roads, bridges, courts, cemeteries, liens, are in some county. If
laws regulating all of these things are laws regulating the affairs of counties,
why was the 7th section of Art. III expanded over a page and a half, when it
would have sufficed to use the first three lines?
We shall not attempt to define the expression "affairs of counties." We
think it enough to say that sales of whiskey, beer or wine, are no more the
affairs of counties than the sales of shoes, coats and hams.
In Commonwealth v. Hospital, 198 Pa. 270, it is held that the prevention
of the spread of infectious and contagious diseases is not an affair of counties,
for an act on that topic, limited to cities, was upheld. Surely, if an act to orevent the diffusion of physical contagion is not an affiair of counties, neither is
one to prevent the spread of the contagion of intemperance.
In fai the greater number of cases in which the question has been considered, "affairs of counti#-s," etc., has been understood to refer to operations of
the municipality, its officers, their salaries, their duties, taxation, the indexing of records, etc. Morrison v. Bachert (fees), 112 Pa. 322; 3 P. & L. Dig. Decisions, col. 3623. Many of the decisions condemning legislation as local or
special, proceeded on the ground not that they dealt with tie affairs of counties, but with other matters, e g., prescribing the duties of officers, regulating
practice, Comnnonwealth v. Carey, 2 Pa. C. C. 293; regulating corporations,
Weinnian v. Wilkinsburg, etc., Railway Co., 118 Pa. 192; authorizing liens,
Davis v. Clark, 106 Pa. 377. Frost v. Cherry, has few congeners.
Is it suggested that while sales of whiskey are not afihirs of counties, the
licensing of sales is? The licensing of sales is not done by counties or by county
officers. Thejudicial function is not a county function, and the judges are not
county officers. Nor, as administrative officers, are they other than state officers. The regulation of sales of liquor is not, under our system, the usual business of a county. The state might, for this purpose, be divided into districts,
each corn posed of several counties, and a licensing board for each district might
be created.
The real question before us is the far-reaching and fundamental one: Can
the legislature give effect to the wills of local bodies? FGr if it can, the mode in
which this is done is unimportant. It may be done, as we have suggested, by
the creation of permanent councils, which shall evolve regulations from time to
time, or by the submission of special proposals to the electors, conditioned to
go inito effect upon their consent. Any decision that denies this power subverts the system ofgovernment under which we have subsisted for more than
two centuries.
A subordinate question is, if the legislature can condition any regulations
upon local approval, can it condition the prohibition of sales of intoxicants
upon local approval? That it is not irrational to consult the wishes of tile locality in determining whether sales of liquors shall be allowed, is evidenced by
.nany local option statutes still operative in this state; by the experiments
miade in local option in so many other states and countries. The variations,
from place to place, of the character, habits, tendencies and morals of the
people, make it eminently fit that the opinions aiid wishes of the localities
should have effect, regarding liquor sales, as regarding the hundred other subjects committed ini municipal legislation to their control.
We conclude that the legislature can, by general law, enact that the will
of boroughs, cities, townships, counties, shall control the sale of liquors, and
that this will may express itself through permanent bodies, like councils, or
by a special vote of the electors.
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It follows that the learned court below improperly quashed the indictment.
Judgment reversed with procedendo.

GLASCOCK vs. TEMP.
Contract of bailment-Lien-Livery stable keeper's right to assign claim together with property as security-. eplevin-Acts of April 7, 1807; Dec. 14,
1863.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Glynn, a livery stable keeper, having a lien ol a horse for board, assigned
the claim, together with the horse, as security therefor, to the defendant,
Temp. Glascock, the-owner of the horse, brings replevin.
Setzer for the plaintiff.
When a bailee voluntarily- gurrenders the property to which the lien attaches the lien ceases. - Rodgers v. Grofie. 58 Pa. 414; McFarland v. Wheeler,
26 Wend. 467 ; Doam v. Russell, 3 Gray 382.
Carey for the defendant.
Act of Dec. 14th, 1863, 2 P. & L. Dig. 3985, change. the common law rule
and gives the bailee the right to sell. Rodgers v. Grothe, 58 Pa. 414.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
SIPEs, 3. :-Glynn, a livery stable keeper, having a lien-on a horse for

board, assigned the claim, together with the horse as security therefor, to the
defendant, Temp. Glascock, the owner of the horse, brings replevin.
The Act of April 7, 1807, 2 P. & L. Dig. 3714, gives livery stable keepers the
right to sell horses for their board. The act prescribes the manner of sale and
the conditions under which a sale may be had, but Gynn did not follow the
provisions of this act, nor of the Act of 1863, which provides that in all cases in
which commission merchants, factors and all common carriers, or other persons, shall have a lien upon any goods, or other property, for or on account of
the costs or expenses sustained on such goods or other property, if the owner
fail to pay the amount of charges upon such goods or property within 60 days
after demand, it shall be lawful for the one having such lien to expose such
property to sale at public auction.
It is true that these Acts of Assembly do not give the bailee the right to
transfer his lien, but nevertheless the courts recognize this right in Rodgers v.
Grothe,.58 Pa. 414. A transfer of the charge upon the property, together with
its possession, effects a substitution of the purchaser to the right of the bailee
to receive the money and to retain the property as security; when the sale has
been made in good faith, the purchaser has same right to proceed to demand
and enforce payment after notice as the bailee had. The rights of the owner
remain unchanged. He is bound only for the harge as it existed in the bailee,
and he can demand and receive his property on same terms as from the bailee.
It is the opinion of the court that the case at bar is governed by the doctrine thus laid down in Rodgers v. Grothe, supra, and accordingly judgment
must be for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The Actof April 7th, 1807, 2 P. & L. Dig. 3714, enacts that "all livery stable
keepers . . . shall have a lien upon any and every, horse .
. for the
expense of the keeping."
In case this expense, amounting to $30, shall not
be paid within 15 days after demand, the livery stable keeper is authorized to
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sell the horse at public sale, and to deduct the expense and the costs of sale,
paying the residue of the purchase money to the owner.
But for some statutory provision fo~r sale, Glynn would have no right to
transfer the horse. He would, by selling it, at once have forfeited his right of
lien, and it could not have been claimed by Temp. Rodgers v. Grothe, 58 Pa.
414 ; Ruggles v. Walker, 34 Vt. 468; Glascock v. Temp, 59 N. E. 342 ( Ind.);
Bradley v. Spofford, 23 N. H. 444; Daubiquy v. Duval, 5 Term R. 604 ; MeFarland v. Wheeler, 26 Wend. 467; Doane v. Russell, 3 Gray 382.
It is said, however, in Rodgers v. Grothe, 58 Pa. 414, that a statutory
power of sale, given to the bailee, so far changes the incidents of the bailment
as to authorize the bailee to sell his claim to compensation to another, and to
impart to the vendee the same lien that he had.
The Act of April 7th, 1807, authorizes the sale only when the money due is
at least $30. As it does not appear that Glynn's claim was for as much, it of
course does not appear that he had the right of sale.
The Act of Dec. 14th, 1863, 2 P. & L. Dig. 3985, gives a power of sale to "commission merchants, factors, and all cominon carriers and other persons" having
liens, for the expenses of "carriage, storage or labor bestowed" on "goods,
wares, merchandise or other prbperty. " The lien in the case before us is "for
board. " It might be doubted whether this act contemplated a livery stable
He is not a merchant, factor or common carrier, though he is
keeper.
"anotlier person." Yet Rodgers v. Grothe, 58 Pa. 414, assumes that it does.
In that case the charges were for attempting to cure a horse, and probably for
its keep and the cost of medicine, The latter charges are not strictly charges
for carriage, storage or labor bestowed. It is likely, however, that a liberal
interpretation should be put on the act. There is no apparent reason for allowing a sale, in order to realize such charge, while refusing it, when the
purpose is to realize the charge for keep. The keep miay he leemned iniidellial
lor"'
of furnishing it, I'-.,n
to the " storage 1 of a livery animal, as to the
time to time to it. We approve, therefore, of tile decision reached by the
learned court below.
Judgment affirmed.

COMMONWEALTH vs. BABCOCK.
Liquor license- Wholesale-Right of wholesale liquor licensee to bottle beer.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Babcock obtained a license for the purpose of wholesaling liquor for which
he paid $200. A few months afterwards he begins the business of bottling
beer, claiming that he has that privilege under his license. This is a criminal
prosecution for violating the liquor law.
Park for the Commonwealth.
Bauffenbart for the defendant.
Wholesaler may bottle beer. Kiehel's License, 15 Lane. L. R 31 ; Johnson's License, 7 D. R. 248.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

BOWMAN, J. -- It is contended on the part of the Commonwealth, (I)
That section two of the Act of July 30, 1897, P. L. 464, which provides that
persons, residents of boroughs, licensed to sell vinous, spirituous, malt, and
brewed liquors, or any admixture thereof, by retail, shall pay annually
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an additional license tax of fifty dollars, applies to bottlers, and that
the defendant, having paid two hundred dollars for a wholesale license, and
not the additional license tax of fifty dollars, 9hould be found guilty of violation of the liquor law; (2) That it was not in contemplation of those who
framed the act that bottlers, who deal in but one line of goods, to wit : malt
and brewed liquors, shall be required to pay a license fee and tax of two
hundred and fifty dollars, while those who deal in all kinds of liquors, to wit:
vinous, spirituous, malt and brewed, shall be required to pay only two hundred dollars, and that such a construction of the act is an absurdity : (3) That
the correct construction of the act is that wholesalers shall pay a fee of two
hundred dollars, and all those who bottle beer shall pay two hundred and fifty
dollars, and defendant, having paid but two hundred dollars, is guilty.
Babcock obtained his license under the Act of 1897, to deal in intoxicating
liquors, either vinous, spirituous, malt or brewed, and paid two hundred dollars therefor. Under this act he is permitted to deal in any of the kinds
mentioned. We have no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that Babcock
has a right to sell malt and brewed liquors. The question arises, is he subject
to the additional tax of fifty dollars, under section two of the act, in order
that he may bottle beer? This section seems to apply to retailers only. It is
so stated specifically in the act. We cannot see that this section applies to
the present case in any.respect. Babcock is not a retail dealer, and, therefore,
is not violating the act by not paying the additional tax. We are more fully
convinced as to this after reading the opinion of Hon. Amos H. Mylin, some
time Auditor General of the State of Pennsylvania, who, in construing the
Act of 1897, says: "The license fees provided in the first section of the Act of
July 30, 1897, are entirely independent of the fees provided in 'the second
section of the act. Under the second section of the act the additional fee applies only to such persons as sell by retail. It should be added to the license
fee provided by pre-existing laws for retailers, and the section has no other
purpose. Bottlers and storekeepers are contra-distinguished from retailers
under this act." 1 Dauphin County Reporter, 4.
If Babcock has the right to sell malt and brewed liquors, has he not the
right to place same in such condition that they can be sold? He may sell in
quantities not less than twelve pints. Is he guilty of a greater violation of the
law in bottling twelve pints of beer than he would be in buying twelve pint
bottles of beer and selling them again ?
It does seem unreasonable that a wholesaler of vinous, spirituous, malt
and brewed liquors is required to pay only two hundred dollars, while a bottler who deals only in malt and brewed liquors is required to pay fifty dollars
more, or two hundred and fifty dollars. It may even seem absurd, as the attorney for the Commonwealth suggests. But who will assert that no absurdities exist in the statutes of Pennsylvania?
Our construction of the Act of July 30. 1897, P. L. 464, is that under
section one, wholesalers, having license to sell vinous, spirituous, malt and
brewed liquors, may also bottle any of the kinds mentioned; and that section
two, which provides for an additional license tax of fifty dollars, applies only
to retailers.
This conclusion has been reached by Livingston, J., in License of Kiehl
& Kieffer, 16 Lanc. L. R. 311.
We are convinced that the legislature over-looked the inconsistency of
the Act of 1897, but we are constrained to construe the act strictly, and not
for the sake of reasonableness find the defendant guilty, particularly in the
absence of any precedents from the appellate courts of Pennsylvania.
Judgment for defendant.
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OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

The 2d section of the act ofJune 9th, 1891, enacts that it shall not be lawful
for any rectifier, etc., "nor any wholesale dealer or store-keeper to sell any
spirituous or vinous liquors in less quantities than one quart, and brewed or
malt liquors in less quantities than 12 pint bottles, nor shall any brewer or
bottler sell less than 12 pint bottles of brewed or malt liquors."
It is evident that the wholesaler may sell brewed or malt liquors, and that
he may sell them in bottles. But can he put these liquors into bottles, and
then sell them in the bottles ?
The acts of assembly distinguish between a bottler, a wholesaler and a retailer. To bottle is "to put into a bottle or bottles. " A bottleris "one whose
trade is to bottle wine, beer, mineral waters, etc." Standard Dict. ad verbum.
If we modify this into "one whose trade is to buy malt and brewed liquors in
casks, kegs, barrels, etc., and to bottle them, and to sell them in bottles, "1we
shall probably have the definition of the term " bottler" as understood in the
statutes of Pennsylvania. The bottler is one whose business is to pqt into
bottles for the purpose of sale. Can then the" bottler" lawfully sell unbottled
beer? McPherson and Simonton, J. J., have held that he can sell beer in the
keg. In re Application of Johnson, 1 Dauphin 40. Yet with respect to that keg,
he is not a bottler. They probably reasoned, that if he had the power to transfer the contents of the keg into bottles and sell these, he ought to hve the
power to sell the contents of the keg without this transfer.
The wholesaler buys in casks, barrels, kegs. He can sell in these or in
less quantities. He must not descend below a quart of spirituous or vinous
liquors, nor below 12 pint bottles of brewed or malt liquors. Can he put the
spirituous liquor into his own bottles and sell them? Or must he insfst that
the customer bring his own bottle, (or other vessel,) and, at the time of the
sale, pour the liquor into the customer's bottle? On the other hand, can lie
sell the brewed or malt liquors otherwise than in bottles ? So Waddell, J.,
thinks. Commonwealth v. Watson, 2 Dist. 526. Yet, if the legislature intended to prescribe a minimum quantity only, it is not easy to see why it did
not say 12 pints, or one gallon and a half, instead of twelve pint bottles.
Does the legislature intend that the wholesaler may do his own bottling?
If he may, wherein will he differ, as far as his dealings in malt and brewed
liquor are concerned, from a bottler ? The bottler buys in large quantity ; so
does the wholesaler. The bottler sells not less than twelve pint bottles; so
does the wholesaler. The bottler transfers from barrel to bottles, with a view
to sale; so, by supposition, does the wholesaler. The only difference between
them would be, that while the bottler deals only in malt and brewed liquor,
the wholesaler deals, or may deal, also in spirits and wines. If this is the
intended difference between them, it is impossible to understand why the
business of wider scope, that of the wholesaler, pays in boroughs, only $200 per
year for the license, Sect. 1, Act July 30th. 1897 ; 3 P. & L. Dig. Stat. 372,
while that of narrower scope, the bottler's, pays $250.
The suggested criterion that the permissible bottling of the wholesaler is
only incidental, is unsatisfactory. The bottling of the bottler isonly incidental
to sale. The liquor in bulk is distributed into bottles for facility of sale, carriage and consumption. If the wholesaler bottles he does it for the same purpose. If he has the power to bottle for this purpose, who shall prescribe a
limit to the extent of its exercise ? The only limit need be, the extent of his
custom. If, finding purchasers of 500 bottles a year, he can bottle for them, so,
finding purchasers for 500,000 bottles he could bottle for them. If he has customers for twice as much brewed and malt liquor, as whiskey, brandy or wine,
he can supply them; and if there are buyers of 999 times more of the former
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than of the latter, he can still supply them, and he can supply them in bottles.
It is easy to discern that the distinction between the bottler's and the wholesaler's business would become merely verbal. Everything that the bottler can
do could be done under the wholesaler's license.
We think the legislature must have intended to allow the wholesaler to
sell malt or brewed liquor only in the vessels in which he purchased them, or
in vessels furnished by the customer. He can buy bottled beer, or ale, etc.. by
the wholesale, but he cannot buy it by the cask, and transfer it into bottles
not furnished by the customer, for the purpose of sale. To do that would be
to do the characteristic act of a "bottler," and a "bottler's" license would be
a prerequisite.
In License of Kiehl, 15 Lane. 311, it is held that a wholesaler can bottle
and sell beer, by the wholesale, but reasons are altogether wanting. We decline to follow it.
The opinion in Johnson's Application .supra, that a bottler may sell beer
by the keg, i. e. without doing his characteristic act of bottling, is hardly an
authority that the wholesaler can do the bottler's characteristic act,, and
bottle for the purpose of selling.
There may be no sufficient reason, were classifications of businesses to be
now made at one stroke, for distinguishing them by the practice of bottling for
sale, and the practice of selling without bottling. The law does not creatbusinesses, but recognizes them when created. The business of selling wholesale, without previous bottling by the seller, has been long and widely pure
sued; as has also the different business of bottling for the purpose of sale and
and selling. The legislature did not make these businesses, but noticed them
and licensed them. It is not for a licensee for one, on discovering that the two
businesses could be conveniently and economically combined, to insist that his
license for one, is a license for two businesses.
It does not follow from anything that we have said, that the wholesaler
cannot "bottle"
whiskey or wine. The "bottler's" business, defined by
business and statutory usage, is not that of bottling and selling spirituous or
vinous liquors. In re Peak's License, 2 S. Phila. In bottling and selling
them, therefore, the wholesaler is not doing the act which is characteristic of
the "bottler's" business.
Judgment reversed.

BARRET v. FAULKNER
Wills-Interpretation- Trust for sole and separate use-Active trusteeslRule in Shelly's case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Eliza Barrett, mother of Sarah, devised a farm to her son John "in trust,
to pay the net rents to Sarah during her life, for her sole and separate use,
and, at her death to convey it to her children, or the issue of such children as
--hall be dead, such issue taking only what their parent would have taken if
alive; but if she shall die without issue, then to convey it to himself in fee."
Sarah was, and still is, unmarried. Claiming a fee, however, she has contracted to sell the land in fee to Faulkner, who declines the deed, on the
ground that Sarah cannot give a good title in fee. Assumpsit for purchase
money.
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Robertson for the plaintiff.
Plaintiff takes a fee. Yarnall's Appeal, 70 Pa. 335; when the purpose of
a trust fails, a devisee for life takes a fee.
TVashington for the defendant.
Trusts fail where cestui que trust was neither married nor in contemplation of marriage, unless active duties are imposed. Ogden's Appeal, 70 Pa.'
507. Active duties are here imposed. Kuntzleman's Appeal, 136 Pa. 151.
William's Appeal, 83 Pa. 377.

1 OPINION

OF THE COURT.

LABAR, J. :-This is an action of assumpsit for the purchase money of a
farm which plaintiff contracted to sell in fee to Faulkner, who declines to accept the deed on the ground that she cannot give a good title in fee. Plaintiff
derived her title by devise from her mother, Eliza Barrett.
By the will of Eliza Barrett, she devised the farm to her son, John, in
trust to "pay the net rents to Sarah during her life, for her sole and separate
use, and at her death to convey it to her children, or the issue of such children
as should then be dead, such issue taking only what theirparents would have
taken if alive, but if she shall die without issue then to convey it to himself in
fee."
The interest of Sarah Barrett In the premises depends upon the interpretation of the will of Eliza Barrett, deceased.
The object of all interpretation of wills is to ascertain the intention of the
testator.-Tiedeman on Real Property, p. 884.
The intention of the testator must be gathered from the will itself.
Miller's Appeal, 113 Pa. 4.59 ; Baker's Appeal, 115 Pa. 591.
The words of the will does create a separate use trust. A trust merely for
coverture will fall if there is no marriage in fact or in contemplation to support it, or if the cestui que trust becomes discovert by the death of her husband,
and the circumstance that the trust imposes active duties upon the trustee
will not prevent that result ; Megargee vs. Naglee, 64 Pa. 216 ; Kuntzleman's
Estate, 136 Pa. 142; Yarnall's Appeal, 70 Pa. 336 ; Ogden's Appeal, 70 Pa.
501. Quin's Estate, 144 Pa. 444.
It does not appear by the facts in this case that Sarah Barrett was even in
contemplation of marriage at the time the devise was made. But an examination of the entire clause of the will shows that the separate use trust was
not the main or controlling feature of the trust. Where an active trust is
created to give effect to a well defined lawful purpose of a testator in relation
to his family, the trust will be sustained, whether the cestui que trust be sui
juris or not. Bispham on Equity (6th edition) pp. 84-87 ; Barnett's Appeal,
46 Pa. 392; Earp's Appeal, 25 Pa. 119; William's Appeal, 83 Pa. 377;
Phillip's Appeal, 80 Pa. 472'; Sivezly's Appeal, 106 Pa. 201.
A trust to pay the net income of realty to the cestui que trust involves the
exercise of discretion by the trustee and constitutes an active and continuing
trust. Wolfinger v. Fell 195 Pa. 12; Hemphill's Estate, 180 Pa. 95.
If the beneficiary of a trust be a woman the benefactor can protect her
from her own debts and improvidence as well as from those of her husband.
Ashhurst's Appeal, 77 Pa. 464; Ash's Appeal, 80 Pa. 497; Seitzinger's
Estate, 170 Pa. 500.
The duties of the trustee are constant and continuous, and not at all dependent upon the coverture of Sarah Barrett. The trustee is to receive the
net income of the property and pay it over.
For this purpose the legal title was given to him. It involved the necessity of management and care of the estate, and of preservation for those en-
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titled in remainder. Bacon's Appeal, 57 Pa. 504 ; Rife v. Geyer, 69 Pa. 393
Key v. Scates, 37 Pa. 37; Stambaugh's Estate, 135 Pa. 585.
We think the testator's purpose, in part, was by means of this trust to
protect the corpus of the estate for the parties entitled in remainder. The
devise is expressly restricted to the devisee's natural life, with a contingent
remainder in fee to the children living at the time of her death and to the
issue of such as may then be deceased, leaving such issue.
Those entitled in remainder are not the heirs general in fee or in tail, but
specific children and issue of deceased children; and even if the children
would take as heirs, the trust will be preserved to protect the contingent remainderman, John Barrett. For a trust is never executed when its preservation is necessary to support a contingent remainder. Little v. Wilcox, 119
Pa. 439 ; Kuntzleman's Estate, 136 Pa. 142.
The rule in Shelly's case has no application where the remainder is to the
"children" of the life tenant, and to the issue or children of such children as
shalt be deceased at the time of his death. Watson's Appeal, 125 Pa. 340;
Fetherman's Estate, 181 Pa. 349; Mannerback's Estate, 133 Pa. 342; Sims'
Estate, 130 Pa. 451.
In Delbert's Appeal, 83 Pa. 462, the facts of which are similar to those of
the case at bar, viz: Testator devised an eighth of his estate to each of his
daughters for their lives, and after their decease to all their children then living, and the issue of such of them as may then be dead, their heirs and assigns
forever, in equal parts, such issue taking and dividing among themselves such
share only as their deceased parents would have taken if living; provided that
the portions of his estate thus devised, should remain during the lives of the
daughters respectively in the care and management of his executors, in trust,
to receive and pay over the income to his said daughters for their sole and
separate use, free from any liability for the debts of their husbands. It was
held, that the gifts to the daughters were restricted to their lives, with a con
tingent remainder in fee to the children of each, living at the time of her
death, and the issue of such as way then be deceased leaving such iSue; and
that it was the intention of the-testator to create a trust to preserve the corpus
of the estate for those in remainder, and this intention was not to be defeated
by the void provision for the separate use of the daughters, which was but an
incident and not. the main purpose of the trust. Ingersoll's Appeal, 86 Pa.
240.
Therefore, we are of the opinion that the will of Eliza Barrett created a
valid active trust, which is not executed by the statute of uses, and, consequently, the plaintiffis unable to convey a good title in fee of the premises.
Judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The gift was to the executor to pay the net rents to Eliza for life, and, at
her death, to convey the land to "her children, or the issue of such children as
shall be dead," etc. It is clear that Eliza takes only a life estate. The remainder is to her children, or the issue of children who shall be dead at her
death. If she should die without issue, the conveyance is to be made to the
executor himself. "Die without issue" imports what the context shows, a
definite failure of issue. The rule in Shelly's case is not applicable. This is
reason enough for the conclusion that Eliza Barrett cannot convey a good
title.
The discussion of the learned courtbelow makes it unnecessary to consider
the trust. That trust is active, and no act of Eliza Barrett can "cast it off.
Her conveyance would pass at most, only her right to receive the net rents
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defendant, Henderson, by the presence of the covenants in the deed to his
grantor, is clearly charged with notice and with the clear intention of the
parties to create a covenant running with the land. He has no equity in any
way superior to his grantor.
The same may be said of the second covenant to always repair the
boundary fence. The word "always" shows an intention to attach the covenant in question to the land. The grantee could not have intended that he
himself, his children, his grandchildren, and so oil indefinitely, should be
personally charged with the duty of maintaining the fence. Fortunately, for
posterity, a man cannot compel his descendants to perform all the services
which he lays upon them. The result of such a policy would be, virtually,
slavery. He may give them property, upon condition that they perform certain services. But they have an election. To say that this covenant does not
run with the land, and to compel a man and his heirs to personally perform a"
service, would be to enforce upon theni not the performance of the services
if they chose to acept the gift, but the performance of the service without the
gift.
To show the further absurdity of such a proposition, we think is needless.
On the other hand, the logic and justice of holding it to be attached to the
land are clearly evident. Every subsequent grantee or devisee of the property
so charged, takes with full notice of the incumbrance; the grantee receives the
incumbered land at a decrease in price whieh will compensate him for his
burden; the devisee pays nothing, and can reject or accept as he sees fit.
To summarize, if we hold the covenants in this case to run with the land,
we work no injustice to grantee or devisee, and give justice to the plaintiff; if
we hold them not to run with the land we give more than justice to the
grantee or devisee, and work injustice to the plaintiff.
It was objected by the attorney for the defendants that Cross was improperly joined as party defendant.
Holding as we do, that the covenants in
question run with the lands, we must hold that breaches occurring after the
termination of ownership, cannot affect Cross. The real party in interest is
Henderson, who is alone liable. In accordance with the power conferred upon us by statute, we hereby order that the name of Cross be stricken from the
record.
The case is submitted to the jnry with instructions to find for the ilaintiff
such damages as they think proper. Any damages already caused are to be
taken into consideration. Also, such annoyances as have been caused to
plaintiff in consequence of the breach, and decrease in the value to him of the
property adjoining.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Cross covenauted never to sell liquor on the premises, and to maintain a
boundary fence. He, a year later, conveyed the land to Henderson, who has
removed the fence and begun to sell liquor.
The covenant for the fence, runs with the land. Kelly v. Nypano R. R. Co.,
200 Pa. 229; Scowden v. Erie R. R., 26 Super. 15. So does that not to sell
liquor. Snyder's License, 2 D. R. 785; Fanning's License, 23 Super. 622;
Donovan's License, 9 Super. 647 It was, therefore, incumbent on Henderson to keep them, and for his failure to do so, he is liable to an action.
The damages recoverable are not for the supposed permanent diminution
of the value of the premises ; but only compensation for the injury down to the
bringing of the action, occasioned by the failure to maintain the fence and by
the sale of the liquor. Should the recovery in this action not result in the discontinuance of the violations of the covenants, other actions may be brought.
Judgment affirmed.
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BOOK REVIEW
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS.

ByPrancis Ilh/arton,LL. D.

RI. Parmele, Rochester, N. Y.

3d edition, by George

Lawyers' Co-operativePublishing Co.

Like all the works of Francis Wharton, his treatise on Conflict of Laws is
conspicuous for scholarship, broad generalization, careful analysis and copious
exploration of authorities. Since the first edition of this work, the volume of
decisions has immensely increased, and the additions made to his latest, the
second edition, by-the accomplished editor of the present, indicate how fertile
the courts have been in solving questions of this class during the twenty-four
years that have followed its appearance.
The matter added by Mr. Parmele is of the first importance. It is so incorporated as not to mar the continuity of the discussion, and the notes teem
with authorities for almost every proposition. Striking additions on the subject of legitimation, corporations, marriage, personal incapacities, taxation,
may be mentioned. The supplementary discussions, under the head of obligations and contracts, are much more extensive than the original.
The writer of this notice has frequently been compelled to spend hours of
research on questions, the solution of which may be attained promptly by the
aid of these fine volumes. In this age of insterstate and international travel,
suits in one jurisdiction founded on contracts or tort.5 made or committed in
another, are immensely more numerous than ever before in the world's history. There is scarcely a county court so remotely situated, that its attorneys
do not have, in the course of a year, many cases requiring the application of a
law other than that of the forum. It is not excessive to say that the 3d edition of
Wharton's Conflict of Laws is one of the most important and one of the most
deeply interesting of all the progeny of the prolific law press (if the United
States, born within recent years. It can be unsfintedly coniniended to the
profession.
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS.
LL. D.

By Henry H. Ingersoll,

West PublishingCo., 1904.

This book begins with two banal panegyrics, one on C. T. Marshall, and
another on J. F. Dillon, and in a note on page 3, is a remark upon corporations sole, that is neither historically exact nor free from flippancy. The prejudice awakened by these was, however, quickly dissipated by an examination
of the table of contents and of the treatment of several of the more important
topics. The chapters on quasi-corporations are exceedingly good and give information not easily accessible. They furnish an illuminating discussion of
the creation of counties, townships, parishes, school districts, of their officers,
of their powers; particularly good is the treatmentof their fiscal management.
Ofmunicipal organizationsthere are chapters on theorgauization, the powers, the
officers, the ordinances, the contracts; on improvements made by them, their
police power, their streets, sewers, parks, public buildings; their liability on
contracts and for torts; their money raising power. The discussion of taxation is clear and ample. The division of the work which is devoted to quasipublic corporations, embracing railroads, telegraphs, telephones, water and gas
companies, suffers from compression and brevity. The work is succinct, its
matter scientifically arrayed, its citations copious, its statements clear and precise. We know no work on its subject that is comparable with it in these important respects. Though it is in the "Hornbook Series," every lawyer ought
to have it, and what is more, read it through with care. He will find it no
less interesting than edifying. Of such books there are never too many.

